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1Dr Edgar A. Whitley, Associate Professor (Reader) in Information Systems, London School 
of Economics and Political Science.  Co–chair Cabinet Office Privacy and Consumer 
Advisory Group (PCAG)—Written evidence (LEG0019) PART ONE
Executive summary
1. This submission responds to a key section of the inquiry from the perspective of 
information systems: the social study of information and communications 
technologies.  It focuses on the role of technology when addressing Questions 1–
3 on creating a good law There are, however, also implications for Questions 6 
and 7 (on the role of technology).
2. For questions 1–3, the submission draws on research that questions the idea of 
technology–neutral laws1 and argues instead that technological issues should 
not be left for codes of practice, regulations and statutory instruments.  This 
because apparently neutral technological decisions can, in fact, have a significant 
impact on the way a law is implemented and, as such, should be subject to 
proper, detailed scrutiny.  In particular, these decisions can be such a key part of 
the proposed legislation that they should be subject to more scrutiny than codes 
of practice and statutory instruments typically receive.
Against technology–neutral laws.
3. “Would you say that, done right and should the codes come out right, the 
clauses in the Bill have the potential to improve public services through better 
use of data?” [Question from Matt Hancock, Digital Economy Public Bill 
Committee, 11 October 20162].
4. I was asked this question as part of the scrutiny of the Data Sharing clauses in 
the Digital Economy Bill.  Implicit in the question is the idea that the Bill provides 
the high level description of the government’s intentions (around data sharing to 
improve public services in this case) and that the detail about how this should be 
achieved (and the oversight mechanisms associated with it) are not that 
important and can be left to codes of practice that may not even be scrutinised 
properly by Parliament.
5. This can be seen as intending to produce a form of “technology neutral” 
legisation.  The view that technology is neutral has been described as “one of the 
most dangerous of all modern mantras”3 As Koops4 notes technology neutral 
1 Whitley, E. A. (2013). On technology neutral policies for e–identity: A critical reflection based on UK 
identity policy, Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology 8(2), 134–147. and Whitley, E. A., 




3 Pringle, R., K. Michael, and M. G. Michael. “Unintended Consequences: The Paradox of 
Technological Potential.” IEEE Potentials 35, no. 5 (September 2016): 7–10. 
doi:10.1109/MPOT.2016.2569672.
4 Koops, B.-J. (2006). Should ICT regulation be technology–neutral?, in Starting points for ICT 
regulation: Deconstructing prevalent policy one-liners B.-J. Koops, M. Lips, C. Prins, and M. Schellekens 
2legislation is often a response to the classic concern that technology specific 
regulation might rapidly become out of date or obsolete.  Concerns about the 
role of technology can include technology indifference (i.e. how it is formulated 
or in terms of its intended effects), implementation neutrality (i.e. 
implementation is not tied to particular technologies) and potential neutrality 
(i.e. its effects do not hinder particular developments).  The final approach 
focuses on technology neutrality as a legislative technique that allows laws to be 
sufficiently sustainable in order to provide certainty but also explicit about which 
technologies they are intended to cover (and why) so that whenever there are 
fundamental changes to the technology it is possible to trigger a revision in the 
law.
6. I believe that it is becoming increasingly problematic to produce technology 
neutral legislation of this latter kind.  Instead, there are growing requirements 
for the specifics of the technology to be provided at the start of the legislative 
process.  There are three reasons for this: a) Legislation should be based on clear 
user needs; b) Implementation decisions are always choices; and c) 
Implementation decisions need proper scrutiny and should not be left to lower 
profile scrutiny such as statutory instruments, regulations or tabled codes of 
practice.
7. To illustrate these points, I draw on the clauses in Part 5 of the Digital Economy 
Bill.  Unfortunately, as I noted in my oral evidence to the Public Bill Committee, 
this Part of the Bill is lacking the kind of detail that I believe is necessary.  I 
therefore draw on the clauses present in the Bill alongside indications as to the 
government’s thinking as found in the “Better use of data in government” 
consultation on data sharing5.
Legislation should be based on clear user needs
8. Clauses 38–39 of the Digital Economy Bill relate to the sharing of civil 
registration data (i.e. data on births, marriages and deaths) within Government.  
The consultation document helpfully provides an example of the kind of data 
sharing that might arise with this data: “A couple have recently had a new baby 
daughter.  Following registering the birth of their daughter they applied for Child 
Benefit.  They were really pleased to find out that they no longer had to send 
their child’s birth certificate to HMRC as a new digital service would match their 
daughter’s birth records against birth information held by the General Register 
Office.  The whole experience was far better than their previous experience of 
claiming Child Benefit when they had to purchase a new birth certificate to send 
to HMRC in the post to replace a lost certificate.  As a result they had to wait a 
number of weeks before receiving their entitlement letter and birth certificate.  
This time the process of claiming Child Benefit was straightforward, secure and 
hassle free”. 
9. A real world example of how this kind of data sharing might benefit citizens 
relates to a local authority offering a nappy collection service6, a clear user need.
(eds.), TMC Asser Press The Hague, 77–108.
5 https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/better-use-of-data-in-government
310. Immediately after this, however, the consultation asks about bulk data sharing 
of civil registration data.  “Question nine: Do you think bulk registration 
information, such as details of all deaths, should be shared between civil 
registration officials and specified public authorities to ensure records are kept 
up to date (e.g. to prevent correspondence being sent to families of a deceased 
person)?”.
11. Whilst such receipt of such correspondence can be distressing, this is already 
covered by the existing Tell us once service7.  No guidance is provided, however, 
about the other user needs that might be addressed by these bulk data sharing 
provisions, nor is there any evidence of what the Government Digital Service 
describes as “discovery” work (“A short phase, in which you start researching the 
needs of your service’s users, find out what you should be measuring, and 
explore technological or policy-related constraints”8).
Implementation decisions are always choices 
12. The government has stated that their approach to data sharing would have 
“positive benefits on privacy and security” there are different ways of 
implementing the data sharing proposals around civil registration.   It is possible 
to implement data sharing in a way that is privacy enhancing, for example by 
using attribute checks.  Here a local authority offering the nappy service only 
needs to check the “attribute” of whether a household has a child under 4 years 
of age—the answer is either Yes or No.  They do not need to know the child’s 
actual age9 nor see their birth certificate10.  Other implementations of data 
sharing, however, can be much more privacy invasive and increase data handling 
risks11 with significant consequences for public trust.
13. Similar implementation decisions can be found in the clauses about addressing 
fuel poverty.  Here the consultation notes that “Automatic [fuel discount] 
rebates can only happen if the state can inform energy companies (through a 
data match) which of their customers should receive it” (emphasis added), yet a 
few paragraphs later, the consultation states “The only information shared 
between energy suppliers and Government would be a simple ‘eligibility flag’ 
[Y/N] along with customers’ names and addresses (or equivalent unique 
identifiers)”.
14. Having energy companies checking an eligibility flag is a very different approach 
to government informing (all the) energy companies about which of their 







11 https://www.nao.org.uk/report/protecting-information-across-government/ and 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/review-of-data-security-consent-and-opt-outs 
415. There will be operational advantages and disadvantages to both approaches and 
it is important that Parliamentarians are fully informed about the implemention 
choices they are implicitly or explicitly endorsing when scrutinising the 
legislation.
Implementation decisions need proper scrutiny
16. The case of the data sharing provisions add further complexity to the situation 
by seeking to resolve some of the concerns about technological issues through 
the use of Codes of Practice issued by the relevant Minister and to which 
persons to whom the Codes apply must have regard.  Unfortunately none of the 
Codes of Practice were ready for the Public Bill Committee, despites requests for 
such detail being made since the earliest stages (2013) of the policy making 
process.
17. This point has been made a number of times before.  For example, the Joint 
Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill12 made specific 
recommendations about the publication of codes of practice: “Above we have 
demonstrated the importance of codes of practice in containing much of the 
detail about the way the powers in the draft Bill will be exercised. This point 
was also underlined recently by the House of Commons Science and Technology 
Committee.  This is particularly the case in relation to the definitions of 
communications data (see paras 69–70), ICRs (paras 120–122), the removal of 
electronic protection (paras 263–264), and Equipment Interference (paras 292–
295).  The Codes of Practice will provide essential further details on how the 
powers in the draft Bill will be used in practice.  We recommend that all of 
them should be published when the Bill itself is introduced to allow both 
Houses to conduct full scrutiny of their contents.  (Recommendation 84)” (§697–
698 emphasis added).
18. As Mr Edward Garnier noted in relation to the Identity Cards Act (another piece 
of legislation that sought to be technology neutral) a particular problem with 
secondary legislation such as statutory instruments and codes of practice is that, 
in practice, the debates are often poorly attended and so effective scrutiny of 
the details will be limited, raising the prospect of “legislation by statutory 
instrument” [18 October 2005, Column 804].
19. A similar point was made by the House of Lords Constitution Committee in 200913
: “We are concerned that primary legislation in the fields of surveillance and data 
processing all too often does not contain sufficient detail and specificity to 
allow Parliament to scrutinise the proposed measures effectively.  We support 
the conclusion of the Joint Committee on Human Rights that the Government’s 
powers should be set out in primary legislation, and we urge the Government 
to ensure that this happens in future.  We will keep this matter under close 
review in the course of our bill scrutiny activities” (§474 emphasis added).
20. In 2014, the Australian Law Reform Commission14 noted that privacy laws be 
“sufficiently flexible to adapt to rapidly changing technologies and capabilities 
12 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201516/jtselect/jtinvpowers/93/9302.htm
13 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldconst/18/18.pdf
5without the need for constant amendments.  At the same time, they should be 
drafted with sufficient precision and definition to promote certainty as to their 
application and interpretation” (§2.30 emphasis added).
21. Scrutiny of a separate part of the Bill (about age verification and access to online 
pornography), involved discussion of precisely the kind of detail that I am 
advocating (“On age verification, attention has been drawn to the consequences 
of failing to think through plans, including the possibility that information on 
passports and driving licences could be misused when collected as part of an age 
verification system”).
22. In that case, however, the relevant clauses of the Bill are primarily concerned 
with the designation and funding of an ager verification regulator.
23. There is reference to the regulator publishing guidance about “types of 
arrangements for making pornographic material available that the regulator will 
treat as complying with [the relevant] subsection” and a detailed draft BSI 
Publicly Available Specification (PAS 1296) is currently subject to a public 
consultation.
Responding to your specific questions
24. Q1) How effective are current practices in Government and Parliament at 
delivering clear, coherent, effective and accessible draft legislation for 
introduction in Parliament? 
25. In this context, the current practices are not particularly effective as they do not 
provide sufficient detail for proper scrutiny of proposals.
26. Q2) Are there mechanisms, processes and practices at this stage of the legislative 
process that hinder the development of ‘good law’?
27. If these details are not on the face of the Bill I believe that the absence of the 
detail found in Codes of Practice makes effective scrutiny impossible.
28. Q3) Are there improvements that could be made at this stage of the process that 
would result in law that is more easily understandable by users and the public?
29. If the detail is not provided on the face of the Bill then it must be published 
ahead of Parliamentary scrutiny, for example, by issuing draft Codes of Practice.
30. Q6) How effectively do Parliament and the Government make use of technology 
at this stage of the legislative process?
31. As my submission makes clear, my main issue is not with regard to the use made 
of technology rather it concerns the details about legislative proposals. 
32. Q7. How could new or existing technologies be used to support the development 
and scrutiny of legislation?
33. As noted above, provision of detailed Codes of Practice / Statutory Instruments 
would help the development and scrutiny of legislation.
18 October 2016
14 http://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/serious-invasions-privacy-digital-era-alrc-report-123
